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THE RIGHT TO ASSURANCE OF PERFORMANCE UNDER UCC
§ 2-609 AND RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251:
TOWARD A UNIFORM RULE OF CONTRACT LAW

INTRODUCTION

The idea that a contract involving mutual covenants contains an
implied promise that neither party will repudiate its duties has been
accepted in Anglo-American law since its announcement as the doctrine of breach by anticipatory repudiation in Hochster v. De la TourI
over one hundred years ago. Ideally, the doctrine permits a contracting party who determines that the bargained for performance is not
going to be forthcoming to rescind the contract and arrange substitute
performance. 2 The notion underlying the doctrine is that a contracting party bargains for performance, not merely for3 a promise and the
right to win a lawsuit if the promise is breached.
Breach by anticipatory repudiation occurs when a party, by words
or conduct, manifests his intention not to perform a substantial part of
the bargain when the time for performance arrives. 4 Thus, a contract may be repudiated by a positive statement of inability or unwillingness to perform, or by any affirmative act by which a party renders
performance of his duties impossible. 5
When the manifestations of prospective inability are equivocal,
indefinite or uncertain, but sufficient to cause the promisee to fear a
repudiation, the common law provides the promisee no clear guidance
as to how to proceed. Section 251 of the Second Restatement of
Contracts, 6 which is modeled after section 2-609 of the Uniform Com1. 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853). "[W]here there is a contract to do an act on a
future day, there is a relation constituted between the parties in the meantime by the
contract, and that they impliedly promise that in the meantime neither will do any
thing to the prejudice of the other inconsistent with that relation." Id. at 926; accord
Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 16 (1900); Dingley v. Oler, 117 U.S. 490, 502-03 (1886);
Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q.B.D. 460, 467 (1886).
2. See, e.g., Nevins v. Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 73-74, 67 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1946);
Hochster v. De la Tour, 118 Eng. Rep. 922, 926-27 (1853).
3. U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 1 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment a (1979).
4. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250 (1979); e.g., City of Fairfax v.
Washington Met. Area Transit Auth., 582 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979); McCloskey & Co. v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F.2d 101,
104 (3d Cir. 1955); Farwell Constr. Co. v. Ticktin, 59 Ill. App. 3d 954, 961-62, 376
N.E.2d 621, 627 (1978); McClelland v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 322 Pa. 429, 433,
185 A. 198, 200 (1936); see U.C.C. § 2-610 official comment 1 (1977).
5. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250 comment a (1979); Restatement of
Contracts § 380 (1932); see Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 9, 20 (1900); Union Ins. Co.
v. Continental Trust Co., 157 N.Y. 633, 643, 52 N.E. 671, 674 (1899).
6. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 (1979). The tentative draft of the
Second Restatement placed the right to assurance at § 275. Restatement (Second) of
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mercial Code (UCC), 7 is designed to deal with this problem.' Both of
these sections create a new form of repudiation: failure to provide
adequate assurance of performance within a reasonable time after
receiving a demand therefor from a justifiably insecure party."
This Note urges acceptance of the right to assurance into the common law of contracts. It examines some of the questions surrounding
the Second Restatement formulation of this right, and analyzes its
theoretical underpinnings in light of experience under the corresponding UCC rule. It recommends a formulation of the assurance device
that will promote the certainty of outcome and uniformity of decision
which are essential to contract law.
I. PROBLEMS WITH THE ANTICIPATORY BREACH DOCTRINE
A. The Early Doctrine
Early in the history of anticipatory repudiation, the courts developed a strict interpretation of the doctrine, under which repudiation
is found only if its manifestation is "definite" and "unequivocal," and
the covenant breached is "substantial" or "material."' 0 Unfortu-

Contracts § 275 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974). The section was renumbered as § 251 in
the final published version. The final tentative draft was approved and the Second
Restatement of Contracts formally promulgated by the American Law Institute on
May 17, 1979. 1979 A.L.I. Proc. 420-21 (1980). The final published version of the
Second Restatement of Contracts was published in three volumes in November, 1981.
Unless otherwise indicated, all future references will be to the sections of the Second
Restatement of Contracts as they are numbered in the final published version.
7. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 9251 reporter's note (1979): see U.C.C.
§ 2-609 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment a (1979).
8. See 1973 A.L.I. Proc. 232 (1974).
9. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law' of Contracts § 12-7 & n.40 (2d ed. 1977)
(discussing § 2-609 of the UCC, and § 275 of the tentative draft of the Second
Restatement which was subsequently promulgated as § 251).
10. See, e.g., Dingley v. Oler, 117 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1886) (refusal of the
promisor to honor the contract, except at the higher current market price, held not
sufficiently definite); City of Fairfax v. Washington Met. Area Transit Auth., 5S2
F.2d 1321, 1328-29 (4th Cir. 1978) (exclusion of party' to 1970 contract from 1977
contract involving the same parties and subject matter, and replacing the 1970
agreement, held not sufficient alone to support claim of anticipatory breach), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979); Wonalancet Co. v. Banfield, 116 Conn. 582, 586, 165
A. 785, 789 (1933) (statement by a party that he was going out of business and
promisee would have to take his chances that there would be enough money to pay
the debt owing on the contract held insufficient to prove anticipatory breach):
Slaughter v. Barnett, 114 Fla. 352, 364-67, 154 So. 134, 13840 (1934) (clear statement by seller that he does not intend to perform on the due date held not sufficient
to support anticipatory breach action); Farwell Constr. Co. v.Ticktin, 59 I11. App.
3d 954, 961-63, 376 N.E.2d 621, 627-28 (1978) (refusal to perform based on erroneous interpretation of the contract does not amount to anticipatory breach). Johnstone
v. Milling, 16 Q.B.D. 460, 468 (1886) (statement by landlord that he cannot afford to
honor a covenant to rebuild within four years not sufficiently definite).
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nately, a body of inconsistent precedent has developed as courts have
applied their own ideas of "definiteness" and "substantiality."" Consequently, insecure promisees cannot determine with certainty
whether a court will consider the conduct of a promisor to be an
2
anticipatory repudiation. '

There are several courses of action open to such a promisee. He

may: (1) rescind the contract and sue for restitution; (2) ignore the
repudiation and continue preparation for performance in the hope
that the promisor will perform, risking reduced recovery because of
the avoidable consequences rule, which requires a plaintiff to minimize his damages; or (3) suspend performance and immediately sue
13
for breach.
Because the burden of proving breach is always placed on the
insecure party, 4 he acts at his peril. If he protects himself by refusing
to perform, he runs the risk of being adjudged to have committed a

material breach should a court determine that the promisor did not
repudiate.

5

If he fails to act, he risks being denied full damages by

operation of the avoidable consequences rule.' 6

11. Taylor, The Impact of Article 2 of the U. C.C. on the Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, 9 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 917, 920-22 (1968); see Wardrop,
ProspectiveInability in the Law of Contracts, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 380, 392-93 (1935);
Comment, Anticipatory Repudiation Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Interpretation,Analysis, and Problems, 30 Sw. L.J. 601, 603-06 (1976). Compare Salot v.
Wershow, 157 Cal. App. 2d 352, 357-58, 320 P.2d 926, 930 (1958) (statement of
inability to pay the contract price when due not sufficiently definite), and Mollohan
v. Black Rock Contracting, Inc., 235 S.E.2d 813, 815-16 (W. Va. 1977) (statements
by the plaintiff that he could not perform because he lacked the proper equipment
not sufficiently definite), with Nevins v. Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 73-74, 67 N.E.2d 673,
675 (1946) (statement that advance payment would be needed before the contract
could be completed held sufficiently definite).
12. Wardrop, supra note 11, at 392-93, 399 & n.90; see Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 250 comment d (1979); Note, A Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance in all Transactions: U.C.C. § 2-609 Beyond Sales of Goods, 48 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1358 passim (1975) [hereinafter cited as A Right to Adequate Assurance].
13. 4 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§ 975-983 (1951); 11 S. Williston, A
Treatise on the Law of Contracts §§ 1301, 1314, 1337 (3d ed. 1968); Note, Constructive Conditionsin Contracts, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 924 (1942); see S.J. Groves &
Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 529 (3d Cir. 1978).
14. A Right to Adequate Assurance, supra note 12. at 1358-59; see Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 250 comment d (1979).
15. Rosett, Partial, Qualified, and Equivocal Repudiation of Contract, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 93, 94 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Rosett I]; see Void, Repudiation of
Contracts, 5 Neb. L. Rev. 269, 319-22 (1927); Wallach, Anticipatory Repudiation
and the UCC, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 48, 50 (1980); see, e.g., Ringel & Meyer, Inc. v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 511 F.2d 659, 659-60 (5th Cir. 1975); Salot v. Wershow, 157
Cal. App. 2d 352, 357-58, 320 P.2d 926, 930-31 (1958).
16. Rosett I, supra note 15, at 94; Vold, supra note 15, at 319-22; see Roehm v.
Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1900); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d
524, 528 & n.5 (1978). See generally 5 A. Corbin, supra note 13, § 1039; 11 S.
Williston, supra note 13, §§ 1353-54.
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B. The Restatement of Contracts Solution

Section 280 of the original Restatement of Contracts17 was designed
to resolve the insecure promisee's dilemma. It permits promisees to

change position in reasonable reliance on the other party's equivocal
manifestations as to willingness or ability to perform."

The rule is

based on the sound proposition that an obligee should not be required
to bear a risk of failure of consideration created by the words or
actions of the obligor. 9 When the manifestations are equivocal, however, the insecure party will not easily prove reasonable reliance; 20 he
is always subject to second guessing by the fact finder. If the rule is
interpreted in a manner lenient to the insecure party, the potential
injustice is merely shifted to the promisor. Although the equivocal
signals may be explainable, the promisor, given no opportunity to
account for his conduct or assure the insecure party, can be robbed of
his legitimate contract rights by a simple, unilateral change of position
21
by the insecure party.
17. Restatement of Contracts § 280 (1932).
18. Id. Section 280 of the Restatement provides: "(1) Where there are promises
for an agreed exchange, if one promisor manifests to the other that he cannot or will
not substantially perform his promise, or that, though able to do so, he doubts
whether he will substantially perform it, and the statement is not conditional on the
existence of facts that would justify a failure to perform, and there are no such facts,
the other party is justified in changing his position, and if he makes a material change
of position he is discharged from the duty of performing his promise. (2) The party
making a statement within the rule stated in Subsection (1) has power to nullify the
effect of the statement by a retraction, as long as the other party has not materially
changed his position." Id.; see id. § 280 comment b; id. § 318 comment d; id. § 323
comment b.
19. Id. § 280 comment a. Comment a states: "A promisor may justly be required
to take large risks as to the possibility of getting what he bargained for in return for
his own performance, where this risk is due to circumstances over which the other
party has no control . . . but where the risk is due to a statement by the other
promisor that he will not perform his duty, or even to a statement by him of a doubt
whether he will perform it, the risk of failure of consideration is wrongfully imposed
and... discharges the other party." Id.
20. Truly equivocal actions will logically yield a fifty-percent chance that a fact
finder will decide for the other party. See 6 A. Corbin, supra note 13, § 1260; id. §
1259 (Supp. 1980).
21. Change of position operates to prevent a retraction of repudiation, Restatement of Contracts § 318 comment d (1932), prevents a supposed repudiator from
putting an insecure party in breach by tender of conforming performance on the date
due, id. § 323 comment b; see First Nat'l Bank v. Indian Indus., 600 F.2d 702, 709
(8th Cir. 1979), and operates as an excuse of condition. Restatement of Contracts §
280 comment b (1932); see First Nat'l Bank v. Indian Indus., 600 F.2d 702, 709 (8th
Cir. 1979); Diskrnakers, Inc. v. De Witt Equip. Corp., 555 F.2d 1177, 1180 (3d Cir.
1977). The right of an insecure promisee to unilaterally terminate the contract is one
of the injustices the drafters of the Second Restatement aim to abruptly end. The
reporter's note to § 251 makes it clear that the section is intended to stand in place of,
not in addition to, the right to create an estoppel by changing position under
Restatement of Contracts § 280. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 reporter's
note (1979).
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Thus, rather than increasing certainty, section 280 merely alters the
insecure party's dilemma. 22 If the promisee acts to protect himself, he
is likely to have to litigate the issue of reasonable reliance on the
manifestations of the promisor. 2 3 If he fails to act, he may improperly increase his damages.2 4 This uncertainty of outcome promotes
increased litigation and a corresponding increase in transaction
5
CoStS.

2

C. The UCC Solution
The approach of the UCC to the problems of the common-law rule
is to permit an insecure party to demand adequate assurance of performance when the manifestations of a promisor cause reasonable
insecurity.2 6 The promisee may treat failure to provide such assurance as a repudiation. 7
The right to assurance rule of section 2-609 was an innovation in
contract law, 28 based more on policy than on precedent.20 There was
no such right at common law. 30 The right does, however, share a
common practical justification with the Hochster v. De la Tour 3'
decision that first introduced the anticipatory breach doctrine. 32 A
perceptive expression of these concerns on which
modern contract law
33
focuses is found in Hawkinson v. Johnston:
[When there is a dispute] it is far better ... for the individuals and
for society, that the rights and obligations between them should be
promptly and definitely settled .... The commercial world has

long since learned the desirability of fixing its liabilities and losses
as quickly as possible, and the law similarly needs 34to remind itself
that, to be useful, it too must seek to be practical.
22. See Rosett, Contract Performance: Promises, Conditionsand the Obligation
to Communicate, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1083, 1093 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rosett
II]; supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.

23. See Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442, 446 (D.S.C.
1977); Idaho Falls Bonded Produce & Supply Co. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 952,
955 (Ct. Cl. 1952); Restatement of Contracts § 280 comment a (1932); id. § 323(2).
24. See Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1900); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v.
Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 528 & n.5 (1978); supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law § 21.4 (2d ed. 1975).

26. See U.C.C. § 2-609 & official comment 1 (1977).
27. Id. § 2-609(4) & official comment 2.
28. 1973 A.L.I. Proc. 232 (1974); Anderson, Repudiation of a Contract Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 De Paul L. Rev. 1, 3 (1964).
29. See 1973 A.L.I. Proc. 232 (1974).
30. Wallach, supra note 15, at 55; see 2 R. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-609: 3 (2d ed. 1970); Anderson, supra note 28, at 3.
31. 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853).
32. Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation" and the Temporal Element of Contract
Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Case of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1978); Wallach, supra note 15, at 48-49; see supra
notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
33. 122 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941).
34. Id. at 729-30.
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Commentators, concentrating on the economic effects of contract law
and the essentially economic justification for its existence, extend the
reasoning of Hawkinson v. Johnston and Hochster v. De la Tour.
They contend that the legal rules governing contract formation and
disputes should promote certainty among contracting parties and encourage speedy and efficient fixing of liabilities and losses without
direct judicial intervention 3 5-- though the threat of sure if not swift
judicial enforcement of the bargain must always be present. 3" These
policies have been effectively implemented through the Uniform
Commercial Code, which is designed to "simplify, clarify
and mod3
ernize the law governing commercial transactions." 7
D. The Second Restatement Solution
Although Article 2 of the UCC applies specifically to transactions in
39
goods, 38 it has been applied by analogy, to a variety of contracts.
Applicability of the Article by analogy is usually determined by
whether the contract is sufficiently like a transaction in goods.4u Most
courts, however, have applied section 2-609 only to cases involving
contracts strictly or primarily for the sale of goods.4" These courts do
not extend the rationale of the section to those cases most appropriate
for its application-cases involving the combined sale of goods and
services. 42 This focus on the subject matter of the transaction empha35. Rosett I, supra note 15. at 103: Rosett II, supra note 22. at 1085-87. See
generally R. Posner, supra note 25, § 21.4, at 434 (discussing costs of bringing a legal
dispute to trial).
36. See R. Posner, supra note 25. § 4.1: T. Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 14, at 10S
(Collier ed. 1977).
37. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1977).
38. Id. § 2-102. " 'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract .
Id. § 2105(l).
39. See, e.g., Kroeze v. Chloride Group Ltd., 572 F.2d 1099, 1105 (5th Cir.
1978) (purchase of securities); Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445, 448 (10th Cir.
1976) (sale of stock); Meehan v. New England School of Law, 522 F. Supp. 484, 494
(D. Mass. 1981) (employment contract): Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1152
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1981) (sale of interest in real property).
40. See 1 R. Anderson, supra note 30, § 2-102:4 (2d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1981):
Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 447, 464-72 (1971).
41. E.g., Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442, 444-45
(D.S.C. 1977) (§ 2-609 applied only if transaction is a sale of goods within Article 2 of
the UCC); Althoff Indus. v. Elgin Medical Center, Inc., 95 I11.App. 3d 517, 5_22-23,
420 N.E.2d 800, 804-05 (1981) (same): Cork Plumbing Co. v. Martin Bloom Assocs.,
Inc., 573 S.W.2d 947, 958 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (same); Schenectady Steel Co. v.
Bruno Trimpoli Gen. Constr. Co., 43 A.D.2d 234, 236, 350 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922-23
(same), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 939, 316 N.E.2d 875, 359 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1974): Field v.
Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 451 Pa. 410, 422-24, 305 A.2d 689, 695-96
(1973) (same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974).
42. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974); Lincoln Pulp &
Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262 (D. Me. 1977); Ranger Constr. Co. v.
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sizes form over substance. Rather than focusing on whether the contract is analogous to a sale of goods, the analysis should determine
whether the contract problem sought to be resolved is analogous to the
problem resolved by the Article 2 assurances rule. Thus the rule,
designed to solve the problems of equivocal anticipatory repudiation
in sales contracts, should be applied by analogy to the problems of
equivocal anticipatory repudiation in all contracts.
The American Law Institute, recognizing that the problem of party
insecurity in contract law is substantially identical to the problem
resolved by section 2-609, 43 has rejected the original Restatement of
Contracts solution 44 as inferior in practice to the demand for assurance device of the UCC, 45 and has replaced section 280 with Second

Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977); Executive Centers of Am., Inc. v.
Bannon, 62 Ill. App. 3d 738, 379 N.E.2d 364 (1978); Care Display, Inc. v. DiddeGlaser, Inc., 225 Kan. 232, 589 P.2d 599 (1979); Schenectady Steel Co. v. Bruno
Trimpoli Gen. Constr. Co., 43 A.D.2d 234, 350 N.Y.S.2d 920, aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 939,
316 N.E.2d 875, 359 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1974); Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc.,
258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1977); Van Sistine v. Tollard, 95 Wis. 2d 678, 291 N.W.2d
636 (1980). But see Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Hawaii Ct. App.
1981) (applying § 2-609 by analogy to sale of interest in real property). At least four
different tests are currently utilized by courts in analyzing mixed contracts: (1) the
"predominant factor test," which focuses on whether the contract is predominantly
for a sale of goods, see, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974);
Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442, 444-45 (D.S.C. 1977);
(2) the "contract terminology test," which focuses on the language of the contract,
see, e.g., Entron, Inc. v. General Cablevision, 435 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir. 1970):
Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 577, 594-95, 342 N.E.2d 65,
78-79 (1976); (3) the "movability test," which focuses on the definition of "goods" in
U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1977), see, e.g., Cacace v. Morcaldi, 435 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1981); Robertson Cos. v. Kenner, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 387
(N.D. Oct. 23, 1981); and (4) the "divisibility of contract test," in which the court
divides the contract into its goods and services parts and applies the UCC to the goods
portion. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Radiant Elec. Co., 55 Mich. App. 410,
222 N.W.2d 323 (1974); Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 451 Pa. 410,
422, 305 A.2d 689, 696 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1978). See generally

Marshall, The Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to Construction Contracts, 28 Emory L.J. 335, 350-74 (1979) (discussion of the various tests). The goodsservices analysis applied in these cases is designed to ensure that the UCC is applied
only to those contracts that are "transactions in goods" within the meaning of § 2102, U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977); sharp distinction is drawn between those cases to which
the UCC rules apply and those to which they do not. Once it is determined that it
transaction is not in goods, the UCC rules are ignored. In this way, the UCC is
prevented from influencing the common law.
43. 1973 A.L.I. Proc. 232 (1974); see supra pt. I(B).
44. 1973 A.L.I. Proc. 232 (1974).
45. U.C.C. § 2-609 (1977). Section 2-609 provides: "(1) A contract for sale
imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expectation of receiving due
performance will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with
respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate
assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the
agreed return. (2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity
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Restatement section 251.46 Modeled after section 2-609. 4 7 section 251
similarly provides insecure parties a right to adequate assurance of
performance, 48 though the formulation of the rule does differ in some
respects from that of section 2-609.41
II.

APPLICATION OF THE ASSURANCE DEVICE

Many problems of insecurity and uncertainty that are not satisfactorily resolved by the traditional doctrine of anticipatory repudiation
can be efficiently resolved by utilization of the assurance device.1
and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to commercial standards. (3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prejudice the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future performance. (4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a reasonable
time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is adequate
under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the contract." Id.
46. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 (1979). Section 251 provides:
"(1) Where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a breach
by non-performance that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total
breach under § 243, the obligee may demand adequate assurance of due performance
and may, if reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already
received the agreed exchange until he receives such assurance. (2) The obligee may
treat as a repudiation the obligor's failure to provide within a reasonable time such
assurance of due performance as is adequate in the circumstances of the particular
case." Id.
47. Id. § 251 reporter's note; see id. § 251 comment a.
48. Id. § 251(1). Section 251 has not been widely followed since its introduction
in 1974. See id. § 251 (app. 1982). Research has revealed only three cases applying
the assurance device and citing § 251. or its predecessor § 275, as authority. David
Nassif Assocs. v. United States, 644 F.2d 4, 12 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (per curiam); L.E.
Spitzer Co. v. Barron, 581 P.2d 213, 216-17 (Alaska 1978): Carfield & Sons v.
Cowling, 616 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Colo. App. 1980): see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. One circuit court has characterized the right to assurance as "basic
contract law . . . codified in the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-609." Markowitz &
Co. v. Toledo Met. Hous. Auth., 608 F.2d 699, 705 (6th Cir. 1979). In one Hawaii
intermediate appellate decision, the court utilized the device in a real property sale,
citing UCC § 2-609 by analogy. Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1152-53
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1981). At least one jurisdiction has expressly declined to accept the
Second Restatement rule into the common law of contracts. Mollohan v. Black Rock
Contracting, Inc., 235 S.E.2d 813, 816 n.1 (W. Va. 1977). The court in ,\lollohan
did say, however, that failure to provide assurance after a demand can be presented
to the jury as evidence of unequivocal and positive repudiation. Id. This use of the
assurance device eviscerates it. Failure to provide assurance to a justifiably insecure
promisee must be treated as sufficient proof of a repudiation to eliminate the present
anomalies and concomitant uncertainty that are associated with the doctrine of
breach by anticipatory repudiation. Treating such a failure merely as evidence of a
repudiation adds to the list of elements that the insecure party may prove but does
not decrease the risks involved in treating ambiguous conduct as a repudiation.
49. 1973 A.L.I. Proc. 232 (1974): see infra pt. III.
50. See, e.g., Markowitz & Co. v. Toledo Met. Hous. Auth., 608 F.2d 699, 705
(6th Cir. 1979); Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co.. 433 F. Supp. 442, 446
(D.S.C. 1977); David Nassif Assocs. v. United States, 644 F.2d 4, 12 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(per curiam); L.E. Spitzer Co. v. Barron, 581 P.2d 213. 216 (Alaska 1978): Carfield
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When parties have more than one contract with each other, for
example, a breach of one contract may be grounds for insecurity as to
the others. 5' It is a generally accepted rule of contract law, however,
that breach of another and separate contract cannot be pled as a
defense to a breach of contract action5 2 Nevertheless, it would be
clearly unjust to expect a party in such a position to await actual
breach under each successive contract. The assurance device would
allow the promisee to determine with reasonable certainty the prospects for performance of the other contracts. Failure to provide such
assurance would be an anticipatory breach of the contracts yet to be
performed, allowing the insecure party to suspend his performance,
make alternative arrangements for performance and avoid the necessity of expensive judicial proceedings. Repudiation of the future contracts could be litigated in one proceeding, and because the failure to
provide assurance makes the repudiation unequivocal, the claim could
5 3
be disposed of by motion for summary judgment.
When a party disputes the nature of his obligations under a contract, or questions the enforceability or validity of a contract term
without absolutely refusing to perform,5 4 the other party is caught in
the classic anticipatory repudiation dilemma. 5 5 Using the assurance
device, a promisee can be reasonably assured of performance, or can

& Sons v. Cowling, 616 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Colo. App. 1980), Romig v. deVallance,
637 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981).
51. Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442, 443 (D.S.C. 1977).
In Ranger, the defendant had two contracts with plaintiff to supply and install floors
in buildings: the first contract to be performed in 1974 in North Carolina, the second
to be performed in 1975 in South Carolina. Id. When the plaintiff failed to make
payment under the North Carolina contract forcing defendant to sue, defendant
deemed himself insecure with regard to the South Carolina contract, doubting
plaintiff's ability or willingness to pay. Id. In accordance with prudent business
practice, defendant demanded adequate assurance of plaintiff's intention to perform.
Failing to receive the required assurance, defendant refused to perform and plaintiff
sued for breach. Id.
52. Hal Roach Studios v. Film Classics, 156 F.2d 596, 599 (2d Cir. 1946); Ranger
Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442, 445-46 (D.S.C. 1977); Rock v.
Gaede, 111 Kan. 214, 216, 207 P. 323, 324 (1922): Hanson & Parker v. Wittenberg,
205 Mass. 319, 326-27, 91 N.E. 383, 384 (1910); Levi v. L.A. Thompson Scenic Ry.
Co., 128 Misc. 465, 466, 218 N.Y.S. 666, 666-67 (1926).
53. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc..
517 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (E.D. La. 1981): Uarco. Inc. v. Zig-Zag Fanfoling
Corp., No. 80 C 5263 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file); Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981).
54. See Copylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp., 403 F. Supp. 625, 631
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); L.E. Spitzer Co. v. Barron, 581 P.2d 213, 217(Alaska 1978). In
L.E. Spitzer Co. v. Barron, a dispute arose between the parties to a joint venture
agreement when the written contract provided by defendant failed to accurately
reflect the oral agreement under which work on defendant's construction project had
already begun. Plaintiff's demand for assurance that defendant would honor the oral
contract was met by a refusal. Id. at 217.
55. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.

1982]

RIGHT TO ASSURANCE

1301

prove repudiation merely by showing reasonable grounds for insecurity, a demand for assurance and a failure to receive assurance. Once
these elements are proved, it 56follows inevitably that there has been a
repudiation by the promisor.
Injustices inherent in traditional installment land sales contractss"

can be eliminated by use of the assurance device.ss In an installment
land sale contract, the vendor retains title to the property until pay-

ment of the final installment.59 Because the covenants of the vendor

and vendee are independent, the vendee must continue to make installment payments, even if there is a possibility that the vendor will
be unable to produce marketable title. 0 Thus, if a vendor fails to
provide the bargained-for title insurance within a reasonable time,
the vendee may not suspend payment, nor sue for rescission, even
after repeated demands for performance.61 In such a case the vendee
has no- means of ensuring that he will receive that for which he
bargained. 62 The assurance device would permit the vendee either to
receive adequate assurance of performance,
or to suspend his own
63
performance without the risks of default.

A related problem in non-installment sales is faced by a vendee who
discovers, while the contract is executory, that there are defects in
56. See Comment, A Suggested Revision of the Contract Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, 64 Yale L.J. 85, 101 & n.90 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Suggested
Revision].
57. See Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 651, 570 P.2d 1334, 1341-42 (1977)
(Bistline, J., dissenting); Comment, Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale
Contract, 41 Alb. L. Rev. 71, 72-73 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Forfeiture].
58. See Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981); Ellis
v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 651-52, 570 P.2d 1334, 1341-42 (1977) (Bistline, J.,
dissenting).
59. Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 651, 570 P.2d 1334, 1341 (1977) (Bistline,
J., dissenting); M. Madison & J. Dwyer, The Law of Real Estate Financing 8.03
(1981); Forfeiture,supra note 57, at 73-74.
60. Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 651, 570 P.2d 1334, 1341 (1977) (Bistline,
J., dissenting); M. Madison & J. Dwyer, supra note 59,
8.03. Should a vendee
default with respect to payment, the vendor may bring an action in ejectment and
retain as liquidated damages any payments made. Id.; Forfeiture,supra note 57, at
79-91.
61. See Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 218-19, 485 P.2d 957, 960-61 (1971);
Forfeiture,supra note 57, at 100 & n.223.
62. See, e.g., Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 651, 510 P.2d 1334, 1341 (1977)
(Bistline, J., dissenting); Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 219-20, 485 P.2d 957,
962-64 (1971) (Shepard, J., dissenting).
63. See Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981). The
Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA) includes a right to receive adequate assurance section that is almost identical to § 2-609 of the UCC. U.L.T.A. § 2-403, 13
U.L.A. 621 (1977). The ULTA has not been adopted by any jurisdiction. U.L.A.
Directory of Acts 9-73 (1982). Romig v. deVallance is the only case applying § 2-609
by analogy to the sale of an interest in real property. 637 P.2d at 1152. But cf.
Markowitz & Co. v. Toledo Met. Hous. Auth., 608 F.2d 699, 705 (6th Cir. 1979)
(finding the right to assurance to be a general proposition of contract of law).
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vendor's title to the property. 4 Under the traditional rule, if the
vendor can clear the defects within a reasonable time, the vendee
must tender the purchase price and demand clear title.65 The vendor
is then entitled to a reasonable time after the contract closing date to
cure any defects in title and tender a valid deed.66 If the vendee fails

or refuses to tender the purchase price until the vendor7 cures the

defects, he will be held to have repudiated the contract.
Insecure vendees are thus expected to continue preparation for
performance without being sure of receiving the agreed return. 8

Moreover, financing for such transactions, which must usually be

arranged in advance of the contract closing date, 69 may not be available without a certificate of unencumbered title from a title guaranty

company.70 A vendee may therefore be unable to tender the purchase
price on the closing date. 71

The assurance device would allow a

64. See, e.g., Cohen v. Kranz, 12 N.Y.2d 242, 244, 189 N.E.2d 473, 474, 238
N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (1963); Bord v. Brindisi, 49 A.D.2d 695, 695-96, 370 N.Y.S.2d
766, 767-68 (1975); Grady v. Balmain, 28 A.D.2d 702, 702, 280 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957
(1967).
65. E.g., O'hara Group Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Hous. Sys., 595 P.2d 679, 684
(Colo. 1979) (en banc); Cohen v. Kranz, 12 N.Y.2d 242, 246, 189 N.E.2d 473, 475,
238 N.Y.S.2d 928, 932 (1963); see Ace Realty, Inc. v. Looney, 531 P.2d 1377, 1380
(Okla. 1974).
66. O'hara Group Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Hous. Sys., 595 P.2d 679, 684 (Colo.
1979) (en banc); Cohen v. Kranz, 12 N.Y.2d 242, 246, 189 N.E.2d 473, 475, 238
N.Y.S.2d 928, 932 (1963); Ballen v. Potter, 251 N.Y. 224, 229, 167 N.E. 424, 425
(1929); Ace Realty, Inc. v. Looney, 531 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1974).
67. Cohen v. Kranz, 12 N.Y.2d 242, 247, 189 N.E.2d 473, 476, 238 N.Y.S.2d
928, 932 (1963); Ballen v. Potter, 251 N.Y. 224, 229, 167 N.E. 424, 425 (1929); Ace
Realty, Inc. v. Looney, 531 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1974). See O'hara Group Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Hous. Sys., 595 P.2d 679, 684 (Colo. 1979) (en bane). This
situation was anticipated by the Reporter for the Second Restatement of Contracts as
one in which the vendee should have a right to demand assurance. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 251 comment b, illustration 5 (1979); accord U.L.T.A. § 2403(c) & comment 5, 13 U.L.A. 622 (1977).
68. See, e.g., Cohen v. Kranz, 12 N.Y.2d 242, 246, 189 N.E.2d 473, 475, 238
N.Y.S.2d 928, 932 (1963); Bord v. Brindisi, 49 A.D.2d 695, 695-96, 370 N.Y.S.2d
766, 766 (1975).
69. See F. Galaty, W. Allaway & R. Kyle, Modern Real Estate Practice § 23, at
359 (9th ed. 1982).
70. See M. Madison & J. Dwyer, supra note 59, ' 3.04[15].
71. Of course, any vendee hindered or prevented from performing through the
fault of the vendor will have a defense to any action by the vendor for damages or
specific performance and will have a right to sue the vendor for breach. 4 A. Corbin,
supra note 13, § 947. However, it must be remembered that parties bargain for
performance, not for a promise and the right to a law suit if it is not fulfilled. U.C.C.
§ 2-609 comment 1 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment a
(1979). Utilization of the assurance device before the closing of the transaction would
indicate to the vendor the need for due performance and shift the risk of noncompliance to him.
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vendee to receive assurance of performance, 72 or enable him to sue for
breach without the necessity of arranging expensive financing or risking loss of any deposit paid on account. These problem cases, typical
of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine, demonstrate how the right to
assurance allows an insecure party to "force a crystallization of the
situation so that he can determine his own future course of conduct."' 73 In contrast to traditional common-law rules, the assurance
device reduces uncertainty of outcome in litigation7 and thereby
promotes settlement.7 5
III. INTERPRETATION

OF THE DEVICE

To derive maximum benefit from the assurance device, the rule
available for contracts in general should be substantially identical to
the one developed for sale of goods. If a largely identical formulation
is used, courts and parties can freely draw on the valuable, though
limited, fund of decisional precedent7 6 behind section 2-609 as an aid
to interpretation and application of the device. This practice will
build a unified body of precedent in which there is no unnecessary
distinction made between contracts for sale of goods and those that
are not.77 The assurance device is designed to, and does, solve a
72. In this case it appears that the only adequate assurance that the vendee will
receive clear title on the closing date would be a certificate of clear title from a title
guaranty company. Thus, to provide adequate assurance, the vendor would probably have to clear the defects in title.
73. Wallach, supra note 15, at 55.
74. See State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Act, Recommendation and Studies
Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code, Legislative Doc. No. 65B, at 162 (1954),
reprintedin 1 State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report, Hearings on the Uniform
Commercial Code 47, 98 (1954) [hereinafter cited as 1954 Report]; Suggested Revision, supra note 56, at 101.
75. See R. Posner, supra note 25, § 21.4; Rosett I, supra note 15, at 103. The
assurance device may also promote settlement by promoting communication between
parties. See Holt v. Seversky Electronatom Corp., 452 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1971).
76. See, e.g., National Ropes, Inc. v. National Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53,
60-61 (5th Cir. 1975) (what constitutes demand for assurance); Copylease Corp. of
Am. v. Memorex Corp., 403 F. Supp. 625, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (adequacy of
assurance); Erwin Weller Co. v. Talon Inc., 295 N.V.2d 172, 174 (S.D. 1980)
(reasonable grounds for insecurity); Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co., 546 S.\V.2d 346,
354 n.4 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (same).
77. Such distinctions are often made on apparently arbitrary grounds; similar
contracts may by one court be designated a sale of goods and by another sale of
services. Compare Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442, 44445
(D.S.C. 1977) (sale and installation of floors in apartment building held not sale of
goods), and Cork Plumbing Co. v. Martin Bloom Assocs., Inc., 573 S.V.2d 947, 958
(Mo. App. 1978) (sale and installation of plumbing fixtures in apartment building
held not sale of goods), with Cleveland Lumber Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397
F. Supp. 1088, 1092 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (sale and installation of woodburning kiln held
sale of goods), and Meyers v. Henderson Constr. Co., 147 N.J. Super. 77, 82-83, 370
A.2d 547, 550 (1977) (sale and installation of warehouse overhead doors held sale of
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problem common to all contracts and should apply to all contracts
without regard to subject matter.78
The evident superiority of the UCC assurance device stems from the
efficiency with which it protects the expectation interest of contracting parties. This results from several aspects of its language and
operation, each of which invite analysis and comparison to the corresponding clauses proposed for the common law in the Second Restatement formulation.
A. Groundsfor Insecurity
The UCC is applied to any "insecurity . . .with respect to . ..
performance, ' 79 whether or not it is by nonperformance, or would
give rise to a claim for damages for total breach.8 0
In contrast, the language in section 251 of the Second Restatement
limits the basis of reasonable grounds for insecurity to prospective
breaches by nonperformance that would give rise to a claim for
damages for total breach. 8 ' The potential grounds for insecurity are
much broader than this.8 2 If courts adopt such limited grounds for

goods), and Ellis Mfg. Co. v. Brant, 480 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (sale
and installation of kitchen fixtures in apartment building treated as sale of goods
without discussing the goods-services distinction). Rather than apply the UCC rules
by analogy to contracts that are not sale of goods, some courts either go to great
lengths to characterize the contract as a sale of goods or apply the UCC rules without
discussion of the matter at all. See, e.g., Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v.
Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 1977) (sale of a million
gallon water tank held sale of "movable" goods); Omaha Pollution Control Corp. v.
Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F. Supp. 1069, 1085-86 (D. Neb. 1976) (design, construction, sale and operation of pollution control facilities covered by the UCC by
analogy); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300,
1301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (UCC applied to construction and sale of two asphalt
plants), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Robertson
Cos. v. Kenner, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 387, 391-92 (N.D. Oct. 23, 1981)
(sale of galvanized steel warehouse treated as sale of goods).
78. See Markowitz & Co. v. Toledo Met. Hous. Auth., 608 F.2d 699, 705 (6th
Cir. 1979); Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981);
supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
79. U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1977).
80. See id. § 2-609 official comment 3 (suggesting that minor breaches such as
defective or delayed delivery can operate as sufficient insecurity with respect to
performance); Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 424 F. Supp. 770, 776
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (late delivery when time is not of the essence).
81. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251(1) (1979); Rosett I, supra note 15, at
105. But see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment c (1979). Actual
minor breaches can be reasonable grounds to suspect more serious breaches in the
future, and an obligee can base a demand for assurance on such minor breaches
whether or not he brings suit for damages. Id.; see Carfield & Sons v. Cowling, 616
P.2d 1008, 1009-10 (Colo. App. 1980) (involving minor breach and applying tentative draft of § 251).
82. Rosett II, supra note 22, at 1087 n.5.
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seeking assurance, insecure parties will be faced with the pre-UCC
dilemma; 3 they must accurately predict whether the court will find
the anticipated breach sufficiently "material" or "substantial" to warrant the demand for assurance. The focus should be on whether, in
any given case, the party is reasonable 84 in his belief that he will not
receive all that he bargained for under the contract. Broadening
grounds for insecurity would promote the primary benefit to be
gained from use of the assurance device-the reduction of uncertainty.8 5
B. Time Certain to Respond
A further source of certainty in the UCC provision is the inclusion
of a specific time within which assurances must be given.bb The
thirty-day limit of section 2-609 is a maximum which may be varied
by agreement.8 7 The drafters of the UCC considered it necessary to
"free the question of reasonable time from uncertainty in later litigation" by including a specific time limit.8 8 In this respect, nonsales
83. J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 6-2, at 211 (2d ed.
1980); see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
84. Reasonableness is a concept that varies from case to case. With respect to
claims of insecurity under § 2-609 of the UCC, courts have generally adopted an
objective standard of reasonableness. E.g.. Diskmakers, Inc. v. DeWitt Equip.
Corp., 555 F.2d 1177, 1179 (3d Cir. 1977) (criteria for insecurity are to be judged by
commercial standards); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1976) (reasonable grounds for insecurity must
be determined on objective factual basis: subjective insecurity is not sufficient);
Turntables, Inc. v. Gestetner, 52 A.D.2d 776, 777. 382 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (1976)
(court noted a number of objective commercial criteria underlying insecurity of
defendant as justifying demand for assurance under § 2-609). Incorporation of a
practical business standard also provides a measure of flexibility responsive to shortterm changes in the economic environment that can cause insecurity. In Harris v.
Hine, 232 Ga. 183, 205 S.E.2d 847 (1974), for instance, the promisee claimed an
increase in the market price as a reasonable ground for insecurity due to the unusual
situation that caused the price of cotton to more than double in six months. Id. at
184, 205 S.E.2d at 847-48. Thus, the buyer was able to ascertain long before actual
default by nonperformance that the seller intended to default and was able to take
legal action to ensure his supply of the raw material. CJ. Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1322 (E.D. La. 1981) (request
for additional compensation held to be reasonable ground for insecurity).
85. See State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 74, at 162, reprinted in
1954 Report, supra note 74, at 98; Suggested Revision, supra note 56, at 101.
86. U.C.C. § 2-609(4) (1977). It is not clear, however, whether the drafters
intended that the 30-day limit could be extended as well as shortened by agreement.
Although the text states that a reasonable time may not exceed 30 days, id., the
comments seem to authorize any commercially reasonable limitation. Id. § 2-609
official comment 6.
87. Id. § 1-102(3); 2 R. Anderson, supra note 30, § 2-609:3.
88. U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 5 (1977). The first proposed final draft of
the Uniform Revised Sales Act contained a ten-day limit for the provision of assurance. Uniform Revised Sales Act § 99(4) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944) (current
version at U.C.C. § 2-609(4) (1977)).
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contracts are no different from sales contracts.8 9 The framers of the
Second Restatement rule,0 however, rejected a time certain as too rigid
for a common-law ruleY
To promote certainty and uniformity, a presumption should be
created that the thirty-day limit of the UCC represents a reasonable
time within which assurance must be given, absent agreement or
circumstances requiring a different time for response. Of course, careful contract drafters will include specific time limits in any right to
assurance clause.
C. Adequacy of Assurance
A principal source of uncertainty in both section 251 and section
2-609 is the notion of "adequate assurance." 9' Although the cases
decided under section 2-609 are few, 92 they are sufficient to provide a
basis for interpretation of this ill-defined concept. The drafters of both
the UCC and Second Restatement rules apparently intended that
commercial or business standards should apply. The UCC comments
require an objective factual basis for adequacy-or inadequacy-of
assurance just as for determination of reasonable grounds for insecurity.9 3 Although neither section attempts to define adequacy, it is
clear that the duty of good faith
and fair dealing is as applicable to the
4
assurance as to the demand.
Adequacy of assurance can range from a mere promise to perform
to the posting of a guaranty bond." If there are broad bases for

89. Cf. U.L.T.A. § 2-403 comment 3, 13 U.L.A. 621 (1977) (time limit provides
certainty in real estate transactions). Because the concepts of "insecurity" and "assurance" are indefinite, and "reasonableness" can vary from contract to contract, cotnmentators suggest that the parties include clauses defining all three concepts and
limiting the time for acting. U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 6 (1977); 2 R. Anderson, supra note 30, § 2-609:3.
90. 1974 A.L.I. Proc. 349 (1975); Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 11 & n.70 (1981), see
1973 A.L.I. Proc. 232 (1974).
91. U.C.C. § 2-609 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment a
(1979); see Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach-Common
Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 553, 592 (1976).
92. 1973 A.L.I. Proc. 232 (1974); see 2 R. Anderson, supra note 30, § 2-609:3-9
(2d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1979).
93. U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 4 (1977).
94. Id. § 2-609 official comment 3; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251
comment d (1979); see U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
205 (1979).
95. See U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 4 (1977); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 251 comment e (1979); 2 R. Anderson, supra note 30, § 2-609:8; see, e.g.,
S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 529 (3d Cir. 1978) (promise to
perform inadequate because of erratic behavior of promisor); Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (E.D. La.
1981) (belated and qualified offer of performance is not adequate assurance); Uarco,
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insecurity, there must be a flexible interpretation of adequacy of
assurance. A reasonable but tenuous basis for insecurity such as rumor
of insolvency 96 should not require the strongest of assurances. Insecure
parties should not be allowed to rewrite the contract to allow them to
get more through the assurance than was bargained for under the
contract. 97
D. Form of the Demand for Assurance
Some recent decisions under the UCC rule have recognized that the
policy of the section is better served by permitting oral demands for
assurance in some situations,98 despite the section 2-609 requirement
of a written demand.9 9 Section 251 has adopted the better rule
reflected in these decisions: Although the comments to section 251
indicate that a written demand is preferable, the section requires only
a demand that is reasonable under the circumstances.' 0
Questions may still remain as to what actions other than a straightforward written or oral demand will constitute a demand for assurance sufficient to satisfy the rule. A mere demand for monies due and
owing, even though in writing, has been held insufficient to constitute
a demand for assurances under section 2-609.101 Similarly, a request
for advance payment of part of the contract price to enable the seller
to perform has been found insufficient because such a request did not
require any act assuring performance.'0 2 On the other hand, an oral
demand for payment overdue combined with a threat to cancel future, unrelated contracts has been held to be sufficient demand for
adequate assurance of due performance of the future, unrelated contracts. 03

Inc., v. Zig-Zag Fanfolding Corp., No. 80 C 5263 (E.D. I!!.
June 22, 1981) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (adequate assurance requires a clear indication
of intent to perform).
96. See U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 4 (1977); cf. Erwin Weller Co. v.Talon
Inc., 295 N.W.2d 172, 174 (S.D. 1980) (growing amount of credit extended to
defendant constitutes reasonable grounds for insecurity).
97. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v.Brookhaven Manor Water Co.. 532 F.2d
572, 582 (7th Cir. 1976): see U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 6 (1977).
98. See AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.. 536 F.2d 1167, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1976):
Kunian v. Development Corp. of Am.. 165 Conn. 300, 312, 334 A.2d 427, 433
(1973).
99. U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1977): see Teeman v.Jurek. 312 Minn. 292, 297.98, 251
N.W.2d 698, 701 (1977).
100. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251(2) & comment d (1979).
101. National Ropes, Inc. v. National Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53, 61 (5th
Cir. 1975).
102. Nasco, Inc. v. Dahltron Corp.. 74 Ill. App. 3d 302, 309, 392 N.E.2d 1110,
1116 (1979).
103. Toppert v. Bunge Corp., 60 111. App. 3d 607, 611-12, 377 N.E.2d 324, 32829 (1978).
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In United States v. Humboldt Fir, Inc.,' 0 4 a federal contract law
case applying section 2-609 by analogy, notice that strict compliance
with the contract would be required was construed as a demand
obligating the promisor to provide adequate assurance. 05 At no
time, however, did the promisee make any formal demand for assurance. 06 The case illustrates a practice followed by a number of
courts10 7 that could lead to unjust applications of the right to assurance device. These courts view a demand for strict compliance as
somehow equivalent to a demand for assurance.10 In such a case, the
promisor may not have sufficient notice that the failure to respond
with adequate assurance will place him in breach. Courts should
require that an actual demand for assurance be made rather than
decide after the fact that equivocal actions constitute such a demand.
One of the advantages of the assurance device is that it promotes
communication between the parties. 0 9 Consequently, the device
should be applied only when the promisor is given to clearly understand that a demand for assurance has been made, and therefore has
reasonable notice and opportunity to respond." 0
E. Modification of the Rule by Agreement
Under both the UCC and the Second Restatement rules, the implied right to assurance "may be modified by agreement of the par-

104. 426 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aif'd, 625 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1980).
105. Id. at 298.
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., David Nassif Assocs. v. United States, 644 F.2d 4, 12 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(per curiam); Toppert v. Bunge Corp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 607, 611-12, 377 N.E.2d 324,
328 (1978); Schenectady Steel Co. v. Bruno Trimpoli Gen. Constr. Co., 43 A.D.2d
234, 236, 350 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922, af-'d, 34 N.Y.2d 939, 316 N.E.2d 875, 359
N.Y.S.2d 560 (1974).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292, 298 (N.D.
Cal. 1977), aff'd, 625 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1980); David Nassif Assocs. v. United States,
644 F.2d 4, 12 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (per curiam). No clear demand for assurance as
required by the various formulations of the demand for assurance rule was made in
either Humboldt Fir, see 426 F. Supp. at 298, or Nassif. See 644 F.2d at 12. Until
there has been a demand for assurance, there can be no suspension of performance
under § 2-609(1), Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co., 546 S.W.2d 346, 354 n.4 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976), or under § 251. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251(1)-(2)
(1979).
109. Rosett I, supra note 15, at 103; see Holt v. Seversky Electronatom Corp., 452
F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1971).
110. See AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 536 F.2d 1167, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1976).
The AMF court held that lack of a written demand was excusable if the seller had a
"clear understanding that [buyer] had suspended performance until it should receive
adequate assurance of due performance." Id. at 1171; see ARB, Inc. v. E-Systems,
Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 196 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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ties."' 1 ' Unlike the UCC provision, however, section 2-51 offers no
express limitation on the extent of modification.
Any clause seeking to give the protected party overbroad powers to
cancel or adjust the contract, or setting up arbitrary standards for
action by the protected party, should be ineffective."2 The parties
should not be allowed to frustrate the policy underlying the right to
assurance rule by modifying the right out of existence."13 Neither
should the rights granted be expanded to such an extent that the
protected party is given the right to cancel or alter the contract upon
any arbitrary claim of insecurity." 4 It must be made certain that the
right to assurance will not be a device giving protected parties authority, in the name of "insecurity," to rewrite the contract to receive
more than was originally bargained for."15
F. Retraction of Repudiation and the Right to Assurance
Section 256 of the Second Restatement"" also bears on the operation of section 251. Under section 256, a repudiation can be nullified
by a timely retraction or by an end to the events or circumstances
which had caused the insecurity or repudiation." 7

111. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 comment a (1979); accord U.C.C.
§ 1-102(3) (1977); id. § 2-609 official comment 6.
112. See Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532
F.2d 572, 582 (7th Cir. 1976); Northwest Lumber Sales v. Continental Forest Prods.,
495 P.2d 744, 749 (Ore. 1972); Wrightstone, Inc. v. Motter, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Calaghan) 170, 172 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1961); U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 6 (1977).
113. Any security clause setting up arbitrary standards for action or otherwise
frustrating the policy of the rule is likely to run afoul of the good faith obligation of
the UCC, U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977), or the Second Restatement. Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 205 (1979). The obligations imposed by § 2-609 and § 251 are implied
in every contract. Any security clause found to abrogate that obligation should thus
be unenforceable, and the implied obligation should be utilized in its place.
114. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d
572, 581 (7th Cir. 1976); Wrightstone, Inc. v. Motter, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 170, 171 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1961): U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 6 (1977).
115. See Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532
F.2d 572, 582 (7th Cir. 1976); U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 6 (1977).
116. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 256 (1979).
117. Id. Section 256 provides: "(1) The effect of a statement as constituting a
repudiation under § 250 or the basis for a repudiation under § 251 is nullified by a
retraction of the statement if notification of the retraction comes to the attention of
the injured party before he materially chahges his position in reliance on the repudiation or indicates to the other party that he considers the repudiation to be final. (2)
The effect of events other than a statement as constituting a repudiation under § 50
or the basis for a repudiation under § 251 is nullified if, to the knowledge of the
injured party, those events have ceased to exist before he materially changes his
position in reliance on the repudiation or indicates to the other party that he considers the repudiation to be final." Id.
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Section 2-611(2) of the UCC provides the better rule that a repudiator may retract a repudiation but must give adequate assurance of
performance upon demand.1 8 This is the logical rule because a
repudiation is sufficient cause for insecurity and warrants a demand
that assurance be provided." 9 The right to continuing security that
performance will be forthcoming when due' 20 requires that the insecure party be permitted to demand adequate assurance of performance as a condition precedent to an effective retraction of repudiation.
CONCLUSION

Contracting parties bargain for performance, not merely for promises. When faced with prospective failure of consideration, parties to
sales and nonsales contracts share a common problem of insecurity
with respect to performance and require similar relief. The assurance
device dispels such insecurity and should be accepted into the common
law of contracts in a form virtually identical to that contained in the
UCC. A uniform right to assurance rule will avoid arbitrary distinctions between contracts that are for sale of goods and those that are
not, and will promote judicial efficiency and uniformity of decision in
contract law.
Thomas M. Campbell

118. U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (1977). The Reporter's note to § 256 says the section
accords with § 2-611, which also allows retraction of repudiation in certain circumstances. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 256 reporter's note (1979); see U.C.C. §
2-611 (1977). The latter section includes a clause to the effect that any retraction
"must include any assurance justifiably demanded under the provisions of this Article." Id. § 2-611(2). The comments to this section make it clear that failure to
provide assurances demanded under the assurance section will render the retraction
ineffective. Id. § 2-611 official comment 2.
119. U.C.C. § 2-611 official comment 2 (1977).
120. Id. § 2-609 official comment 1; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251
comment a (1979); see Hochster v. De la Tour, 118 Eng. Rep. 922, 926 (1853).

